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NOTES 
THE FCC COMPUTER INQUIRY: Interfaces of 
Competitive and Regulated Markets 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the advent of computer technology, data processing and 
communication services have become increasingly interdependent. 
In 1966, the Federal Communications Commission launched the 
Computer Inquiry1 to explore the broad range of regulatory and 
policy problems generated by this technological development.2 The 
original scope of the inquiry was defined expansively by the Com-
mission when it stated: 
We addressed ourselves initially to the development of informa-
tion regarding actual and potential computer uses of communication 
facilities and services. We sought also to develop views and recom-
mendations as to whether there is any need for new or improved 
common carrier service offerings, or for revised rates, regulations, 
and practices of carriers to meet the emerging communications re-
quirements for the processing of data; whether, and under what 
circumstances, the rendition of data processing and other computer 
services involving the use of communications facilities should be 
free from, or subject to, Government regulation; whether, and under 
what conditions, the entry into the provision of such computer 
services by common carriers and others requires regulatory control; 
and whether any measures are required to be taken by the com-
puter industry, communications common carriers, or the government 
to protect the privacy of data stored in computers and transmitted 
over communications facilities.3 
However, by April of 1970, the Commission had narrowed the 
scope of its inquiry to the issues of most basic concern in the com-
munications and computer industries: the nature and extent of Com-
mission regulation of data processing and of carrier entry into the 
data processing market.4 The Commission resolved these issues in its 
I. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communication Services and Facilities, Notice of Inquiry, 7 F.C.C.2d 11 (1966). 
2. Under section 1 of the Communications Act of 1934, the Commission is charged 
with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and 
radio." 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970). 
3. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communication Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 291 
(1970) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Tentative Decision]. 
4. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 292-95. The Commission noted that the 
remainder of the issues originally encompassed by the inquiry had been or would be 
disposed of by other proceedings. 28 F.C.C.2d at 292-93. In particular, the Commission 
declared that the issues of privacy and security of data were beyond its jurisdiction. 
28 F.C.C.2d at 294-95. The question of whether data processing services should be 
provided by new common carriers designed specifically for that purpose was dealt 
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Final Decision5 when it concluded that it should not regulate the 
data processing industry6 and that communications common carriers7 
should be permitted to enter the data processing market only 
through separately incorporated subsidiaries.8 
II. BACKGROUND: THE GROWING INTERDEPENDENCE 
OF COMPUTERS AND COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
Two major technological developments fostered the increasingly 
close relationship between data processing and communications. In 
the early stages of computer use, access to a computer was effected 
only through on-site electronic input and output devices. Conse-
quently, a user was compelled to mail or otherwise physically deliver 
data to the computer's location and to carry the processed data back 
to the site of his business. One major breakthrough was the develop-
ment of input and output devices, called terminals, which a com-
puter user can install at the site of his business and use to transmit 
and receive his data directly to and from the computer at some re-
mote location.0 The conduits for these terminal-to-computer trans-
missions are telephone and telegraph facilities. Because computers 
and communications facilities both operate electronically, they form 
a beautifully meshed transmission team that eliminates the burden-
some costs of having human labor code messages for transmission and 
decode them after reception. 
Initially, another shortcoming of computers was that they were 
capable of processing only one job at a time even if that job only 
with in Microwave Communications, Inc., 18 F.C.C.2d 953 (1969), reconsideration 
denied, 21 F.C.C.2d 190 (1970), modification granted, Zl F.C.C.2d 380 (1971), appeal 
pending sub nom. American Tel. & Tel. Co. v. FCC, Case Nos. 23959, 23962 (D.C. Cir.), 
and Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Application to 
Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public Point-to-Point 
Microwave Radio Service and Proposed Amendments to Parts 21, 43, and 61 of the 
Commission's Rules, First Report and Order, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1970) [hereinafter 
Specialized Common Carrier Services]. 
5. Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer 
and Communication Services and Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 
(1971) [hereinafter Final Decision], reconsideration denied, 34- F.C.C.2d 557 (1972). 
The Final Decision and denial of reconsideration are currently being challenged by 
several communications carriers in the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 37 
TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., April 19, 1972, at 8-10. Further developments can be found 
in 37 id., June 14, 1971, at 4; 38 id., April 3, 1972, at 11; 38 id., May 22, 1972, at 12-15; 
38 id., June 26, 1972, at 10; 38 id., July 10, 1972, at 12-14. 
6. 28 F.C.C.2d at 277. See also Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297-98. 
7. "Common carrier" is defined by the Communications Act of 1934- as "any person 
engaged as a common carrier for hire, in interstate or foreign communication by wire 
or radio or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of energy, except where reference 
is made to common carriers not subject to this chapter •••. " 47 U.S.C. § 153(h) (1970). 
8. 28 F.C.C.2d at 270-74. The rules formulated by the Commission to ensure 
independence of common carrier affiliates appear in 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (1972). 
9. See G. DIPPZL &: w. HOUSE, INFORMATION SYSTEMS: DATA PROCESSING AND EVALUA-
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occupied a small portion of the computer's core capacity.10 Thus, 
the main advantage of remote terminal hookups, speed in gaining 
access to the computer, was somewhat dissipated since the user had 
to wait until the jobs of other users had been completed before he 
could get his data processed. A remote user who attempted to gain 
access to a central computer by communications terminals was fre-
quently confronted with hours of "busy signals" while his expensive 
terminal equipment stood idle. Consequently, it was often cheaper 
and more efficient to send data from remote offices to the computer 
by mail or other manual means. However, another major break-
through, time-sharing technology, significantly altered this situation. 
Computer technicians developed new hardware and software11 that 
enabled the third-generation computer12 to process several jobs at 
the same time.13 
The ability of the third-generation computer to receive inputs 
simultaneously from many remote terminals produced several ef-
fects. First, small firms that did not need or could not afford to 
lease their own computers began to buy time from computer "service 
bureaus," which specialized in the sale of data processing services.14 
Because a service bureau's computer could not be located near all 
of the bureau's customers, the use of data communications lines to 
gain access to remote terminals became essential. Second, for a large 
national firm that could afford its own computer, use of remote ter-
minals to gain access to a central computer from the firm's widely 
scattered offices became more efficient. Thus, as a result of time-
sharing technology and the improved capacity of third-generation 
computers,15 the use of both computers and communications facili-
ties to connect them with remote users expanded greatly.16 
TION 68-78 (1969); H. Zeidler, A. Lipinski, L. Moll, E. Shapiro, W. Kent 8: J. Wensley, 
Patterns of Technology in Data Processing and Data Communications, Stanford Re• 
search Institute, Rep. No. 7379B-4, at 1-7 (Feb. 1969) (distributed by Clearinghouse for 
Federal Scientific and Technical Information, U.S. Dept. of Commerce) [hereinafter 
Patterns of Technology]. 
10. See G. DIPPEL 8: W. HOUSE, supra note 9, at 438-42; Irwin, Computers and 
Communications: The Economics of Interdependence, 34 LAW 8: CONTEMP. PROB. 360, 
360-61 (1969) [hereinafter Computers and Communications]. 
11. "The term 'hardware' refers to physical components in contrast to 'software' 
which refers to computer programs." Patterns of Technology, supra note 9, at I. 
12. Third-generation computers were introduced in 1964 and are faster and more 
efficient than their predecessors. For a description of the various computer "genera-
tions," see Taylor, Computer Systems, in COMPUTERS AND THE LAw: AN INTRODUCI'ORY 
HANDBOOK 40 (2d ed. 1969). 
13. Computers and Communications, supra note 10, at 360-61. See also Irwin, The 
Computer Utility: Competition or Regulation?, 76 YALE L.J. 1299, 1299-1300 (1967) 
[hereinafter The Computer Utility]. 
14. See The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1300-01. 
15. See note 12 supra. 
16. Tentative Decision, 28 f.C.C.2d at 298 (1970). Sales of commercial computer 
November 1972] Notes 175 
Time-sharing came into wide use in the mid-1960's as service 
bureaus began to spring up across the country.17 At the same time, 
firms that leased their own computers but did not fully utilize them 
started to sell time. Competition intensified as numerous vendors of 
computer time strove to provide shared time cheaply and efficiently.18 
Service bureaus also strove to differentiate their services by offering 
their users specialized computer programs, referred to as software, 
for different business and scientific tasks.19 
The combination of advancing technology and vigorous compe-
tition has decreased the cost of computer time.20 As the cost of com-
puter time falls, communication costs become more and more signif-
icant. 21 These costs are of special significance for firms that market 
software as well as computer time because the research and develop-
ment costs of software programs may make it more profitable to 
operate on a national, or even international scale, in order to spread 
these costs over a wider base.22 For such firms, communications costs 
from their central computers to remote market areas determine their 
ability to compete with local firms whose communications costs are 
negligible. Thus, the success of many large service bureaus depends 
on the efficiency and price of communications facilities and services 
provided by common carriers such as AT&T and Western Union.23 
Conversely, increased computer use by remote, time-sharing firms 
has increased the demand for communications services. Indeed, data 
communications is becoming a major source of business for common 
time are expected to exceed I billion dollars by 1973, a phenomenal growth from a 
revenue base of 70 million dollars in 1968. Computers and Communications, supra 
note IO, at 361. 
17. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. Service bureaus also served those who 
leased their own computers but who needed some specialized service such as specialized 
software. Initially it was the marketing practice of the computer industry to lease 
rather than sell computers. 
18. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297-98. It has been estimated that about 
800 firms engage in service bureau activities, many locally or regionally. This suggests 
that it is relatively easy to enter this phase of the data processing market. 28 F.C.C.2d 
at 297; The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1300-01. 
19. See Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297-98. 
20. Miller, Personal Privacy in the Computer Age: The Challenge of a New 
Technology in an Information-Oriented Society, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1089, 1097 & n.15 
(1969). 
21. The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1314-15. 
22. For example, one program developed by IBM cost 2 million dollars. The Com-
puter Utility, supra note 13, at 1317. However, low-cost "canned" programs are also 
available for less specialized computer services. Id. See also Patterns of Technology, 
supra note 9, at 8. 
23. The data processing firms do have the option of using private microwave 
systems. However, since this alternative requires a large capital investment, it is 
impractical. The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1309. Many of the data processing 
firms that responded to the Computer Inquiry emphasized the need for a shorter, 
lower-rate minimum holding period (then three minutes) to permit more economical 
transmission of data. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 293. 
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carriers; it has been estimated that within a decade over half of the 
nation's communications will be transmitted as data rather than by 
voice.24 
Thus, as the data processing industry grows, it approaches "un-
precedented intimacy" with the communications industry.25 The 
problems created by this relationship were the subject of the FCC's 
Computer Inquiry. 
III. THE COMMISSION'S DECISION CONCERNING 
REGULATION OF DATA PROCESSING 
A. Basic Policy and Rationale 
In its Tentative Decision the Commission concluded: 
[W]e see no need to assert regulatory authority over data processing 
services whether or not such services employ communications facili-
ties in order to link the terminals of the subscribers to centralized 
computers. We believe the market for these services will continue 
to burgeon and flourish best in the existing competitive environ-
ment.26 
The Final Decision in no way altered this basic resolve.27 
Because it took this position the Commission was not forced to 
decide whether it had authority to regulate data processing.28 How-
ever, the Commission did note that it was entitled to latitude in cop-
ing with new developments in the communications industry,29 but 
that 
24. Computers and Communications, supra note IO, at 361. The increasing emphasis 
on the data mode has created several problems for common carriers and the FCC, 
some of which were touched on in the Computer Inquiry. See text accompanying note 
3 supra. An initial problem was the interconnection of non-telephone company 
equipment, including modems, terminals, and computers, with the telephone network. 
Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, affd. on 
rehearing, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). Another problem has been the possibility of allowing 
new specialized common carriers to provide communication services for bulk users 
like data processing firms. Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 
(1971). The problem of proper rate allocation between the highly price-elastic data 
market and the relatively inelastic voice market has caused problems. American Tel. 
&: Tel. Co. (Private Line Services), 34 F.C.C. 217 (1963). See also American Tel. &: Tel. 
Co. (TELPAK), 38 F.C.C. 370, 380 (1964). Finally, the security of data transmitted and 
stored in computers has been another headache of major proportions for the carriers, 
the service bureaus, and the computer users both for proprietary reasons and because 
of the need to protect the privacy of the subjects of the data. See generally Miller, 
supra note 20. 
25. The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1300. 
26. 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
27. 28 F.C.C.2d at 268. 
28. See text accompanying notes 113-18 infra. 
29. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 296-97, citing Philadelphia Television 
Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. Cir. 1966). 
November 1972] Notes 177 
[o]n the other hand, [it was] not required to assert and exercise such 
jurisdiction merely because [it] might construe the activity as one 
which could be encompassed within the intent of the Communica-
tions Act of 1934.so 
The Commission thus felt that it could in its discretion refrain from 
exercising the full scope of its potential jurisdiction when such ab-
stention would promote the public interest.31 The Commission ob-
served further: 
In this country we rely upon the "free enterprise" system with the 
maximum possible latitude for individual initiative to enter into 
any given enterprise and compete for the available business. Our 
anti-trust laws are designed to prevent restraint of trade. Govern-
ment intervention and regulation are limited to those areas where 
there is a natural monopoly, where economies of scale are of such 
magnitude as to dictate the need for a regulated monopoly, or where 
such other factors are present to require governmental intervention 
to protect the public interest because a potential for unfair practice 
exists.82 
Turning to the data processing issue, the Commission noted that 
there were no natural or economic barriers to entry into the data 
processing market.38 The capital investment required to enter the 
market was relatively small, and the number of data processing firms 
was increasing steadily.34 Moreover, there was effective competition 
among firms that offered data processing services.35 Not only special-
ized service bureaus but also banks and other businesses with excess 
computer capacity were providing competition in the market.36 
Finally, the Commission indicated that 
[t]he factors which mark the difference between service bureau suc-
cess or failure are imaginative innovation, quality programming, 
and useful service features, rather than the size of the staff or the 
computing installation.37 
Because the data processing market exhibited these characteristics, 
there was no danger of monopolization and no need for regulation. 
Indeed, the Commission concluded: 
We expect the competitive environment within which data process-
ing services are now being offered to result in substantial public 
30. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
31. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
32, 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
33. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
34. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
35. 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
36. 28 F.C.C.2d at 297. 
37. 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
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benefit by making available to the public, at reasonable charges, a 
wider range of existing and new data processing services. We believe 
that these expectations will continue to be realized in the free give-
and-take of the market place without the need for, and possible 
burden of rules, regulations and licensing requirements.38 
B. The Problem of Defining "Data Processing" 
Once the Commission had decided that it would not regulate 
data processing, the problem became to define "data processing," 
and to set a boundary between data processing functions and com-
munication services. In the days before electronic data processing, 
differentiation of functions did not present serious problems. The 
person who manually calculated a set of averages had a distinctly 
different function from the postman who transmitted this informa-
tion. With the introduction of the computer, this traditional dis-
tinction began to blur. The computer can receive pieces of data 
from remote sources, process and manipulate the data, and then 
forward it to a third party. It can also receive, store, and transmit 
unaltered data ("store and forward") with much greater speed than 
the human carrier. Thus, the computer is capable of performing the 
functions of both the human calculator and the data-carrying post-
man. 
Recognizing the combined functions of the computer, the Com-
mission promulgated rules that define "data processing" functions, 
as distinct from communication functions, as follows: 
"Data processing" is the use of a computer for the processing of infor-
mation as distinguished from circuit or message-switching. "Pro-
cessing" involves the use of the computer for operations which in-
clude, inter alia, the functions of storing, retrieving, sorting, merging 
and calculating data, according to programmed instructions.39 
The Commission explicitly excluded message-switching from the 
data processing category. "Message-switching" was defined as 
the computer-controlled transmission of messages, between two or 
more points, via communications facilities, wherein the content of 
the message remains unaltered.40 
38. 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
39. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(l) (1972)). 
40. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(2) (1972)). 
The Commission defined "circuit-switching" as the computer-controlled choice of 
a switching matrix. as distinguished from message-switching, in which the message 
itself passes through the computer mainframe. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 
296 n.l. 
On its face, the definition of message-switching seems to include some of the 
simplest "store and retrieve!' functions, as, for example, where the original entrant 
of data into the computer later withdraws it in unaltered form. Apparently, however, 
the Commission did not intend that its definition be interpreted in this manner. 
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Thus, any computer-controlled transmission of altered data is not 
message-switching and qualifies as unregulated data processing. 
Clearly, the Commission regarded message-switching as essen-
tially a communications service and thus within its jurisdictional 
power.41 However, it did not consider it necessary to exercise its 
jurisdiction over every communication activity. Rather, the Commis-
sion stated that it had 
discretionary latitude under the Communications Act and relevant 
judicial interpretations thereof, to refrain from subjecting a marginal 
activity to [its] regulatory process where it is clear that the public 
interest will be served by such a course.42 
Given this interpretation of its regulatory power as "discretion-
ary," the Commission was compelled to decide which forms of mes-
sage-switching that were "marginal activity" should not be subject to 
regulation. It resolved this problem by defining two categories of 
services involving data processing and message-switching.43 One 
category, "hybrid data processing" services, will be free from regu-
lation; the other category, "hybrid communication" services, will be 
subject to regulation by the Commission.44 The Commission defined 
these two categories as follows: 
(i) Hybrid Data Processing Service is a hybrid service offering 
wherein the message-switching capability is incidental to the data 
processing function or purpose. 
(ii) Hybrid Communication Service is a hybrid service offering 
wherein the data processing capability is incidental to the message-
switching function or purpose.45 
The Commission elaborated on these definitions in its Tentative 
Decision when it stated: 
Message-switching is usually used to refer to "store and forward" functions, which occur 
when an altered message is later transmitted to a third party. The Commission itself 
stated that "message-switching is essentially a 'store and forward' function with respect 
to predetermined information ••.. " Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 296 n.l. Limit-
ing the message-switching category to store and forward makes considerable sense. The 
analogy of the data processor to a common carrier breaks down with respect to store 
and retrieve. Retrieval hardly fits into any category of "communication" service now 
provided by common carriers. For example, ·western Union does not receive telegrams 
for safe-keeping until senders call for them. The storage function in "store and retrieve" 
is merely a data-handling process in which communications is an incidential factor. See 
note 46 infra and accompanying text. 
41. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 277-78. 
42. 28 F.C.C.2d at 277-78. 
43. The Commission designated this general class of services as "hybrid services," 
which it defined as follows: " 'Hybrid Service' is an offering of service which combines 
remote access data processing and message-switching to form a single integrated 
service." Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (codified at 4? C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(5) (1972)). 
44. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 304-05. 
45. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a)(5) (1972)). 
180 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 71:172 
It is our position that where message-switching is offered as an 
integral part of and as an incidental feature of a package offering 
that is primarily data processing, there will be total regulatory fore-
bearance with respect to the entire service . . .• 
. . . If, on the other hand, the package offering is oriented essen-
tially to satisfy the communications or message-switching require-
ments of the subscriber, and the data processing feature or function 
is an integral part of and incidental to message-switching, the entire 
service will be treated as a communications service for hire, whether 
offered by a common carrier or non-common carrier and will be sub-
ject to regulation under the Communications Act. One applicable 
test will be whether the service, by virtue of its message-switching 
capability, has the attributes of the point-to-point services offered 
by conventional communications common carriers and is, basically, 
a substitute therefor. Another test will be the extent to which the 
message-switching feature of the service facilitates or is related to the 
data processing component, or whether such message-switching is 
essentially independent of such data processing. In effect, we shall 
address ourselves to the facts surrounding a package offering with a 
view toward determining the primary thrust of the service offered.46 
The Commission refused to elaborate further on what would be 
regulated or to give specific examples illustrating either category of 
hybrid service. Rather, it reserved explication for future ad hoc de-
cisions of concrete cases.47 
The application of these rules will require identification of the 
relevant service "package" offering as well as a determination of its 
primary "function or purpose." In some circumstances, this should 
not be a difficult task. For example, a computerized employment 
resume service may be used in isolated instances to transmit an un-
altered resume to a predetermined addressee-that is, to perform a 
message-switching function.48 Nevertheless, it should be clear that 
the service "package" is much more than the mere transmission of a 
resume from A to B. Rather, the over-all "package" comprehends 
the total computerized employment resume service. This involves 
the creation of a data bank of information from resumes and from 
other sources such as financial information and real estate listings. 
46. 28 F.C.C.2d at 305 (emphasis added). The final opinion was no more specific, 
merely referring to the tentative opinion. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 278. 
The Commission applied a similar incidental-primary test in an earlier proceeding 
regarding Western Union's Sicom tariff. Western Union Tel. Co. (Sicom Service), 11 
F.C.C.2d I (1967). In that case, the Commission found that the "principal function" 
of Western Union's computer was message-switching. This finding was based on the 
observation that the data processing task, "although to be performed by a computer, 
can ••• find its counterpart in other common carrier communications services where 
a similar function may be performed manually or mechanically." 11 F.C.C.2d at 9. 
47. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 278-79. 
48. Most likely such occurrences would be unintended, but prearranged use of 
codes could make it possible to address a given resume. 
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It should be obvious that the over-all function and purpose of the 
service package (its "primary thrust") is data processing-more spe-
cifically, the collection and assortment of information on job skills 
that enables the party requesting the information rapidly to find 
data relevant to his needs. The message-switching capacity is insepa-
rable from and is in no way independent of the data processing com-
ponent of the service package, and the resume service is not a sub-
stitute for common carrier service in any substantial sense. Clearly, 
the resume service should not be regulated under the Commission's 
rules. A mere message-switching capacity should not be considered 
apart from the service package to which it is attached. Even under 
the narrowest definition of "package," the resume system must be 
viewed as an integrated whole. 
On the other hand, the Commission's distinction between the 
two forms of hybrid services is more subtle in complex cases. The 
problem becomes difficult if we hypothesize a time-sharing customer 
that uses its computer time to control the inventory of a widely 
dispersed group of retail stores. Each retail store and the head office 
has a terminal, and the chain also has available an additional service 
that enables it to send typewritten messages over the time-sharing 
firm's network. The computer file from which messages are sent is 
likely to be separate from the file into which the inventory in-
formation is placed. In other words, the system's communications 
function (message file) can and often is used separately and inde-
pendently of its data processing function (inventory file). If the 
Commission were to view the message file as an independent 
"package" in isolation from its functional connections with the 
inventory control file, it would regulate the message file service. 
Clearly, the function and purpose of the message file is primarily 
communications-it is, in essence, a substitute for a communications 
common carrier's service such as TWX-Telex.49 
However, it is possible to view this service in the context of a 
broader "package." The main purpose of the time-sharing customer 
in using the computer is to control the inventory of its chain of 
stores. The message-switching service may be seen as incidental to 
this broader purpose within the total service "package." If in order 
to run certain programs on the inventory file it was essential that 
the file be completely up to date, then it might be necessary for the 
head office to contact all the individual store managers in the chain 
to determine whether their entries into the file are current. The 
message file might simply be a cheap and easy way to achieve this 
result. Indeed, the file may have been created initially for this 
49. TWX-Telex is the designation used by the Bell System and Western Union to 
describe their teletypewriter exchange systems, which mechanically send unaltered 
messages over communications lines. 
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purpose or for related purposes-that is, to "facilitate" the data 
processing function. While viewed in isolation the message file is a 
substitute for common carrier services, it appears that the data 
processing function is dependent upon the performance of the 
message-switching function. If viewed as one total "package," it is 
arguable that the communications function is incidental to the data 
processing. Under the Commission's "primary-incidental" test, the 
message-inventory service would not be regulated. Yet, it is obvious 
that here we are dealing with more than a mere message-switching 
capacity used in isolated circumstances. 
From a practical policy standpoint, it would be wasteful to single 
out the message file phase of the inventory control system for 
regulation. To do so would be effectively to compel the time-sharing 
customer to buy the message file services at tariffed rates from com-
munications common carriers.50 The customer would thus be forced 
to employ two communications networks-one for its message file 
and another for its inventory file. This would entail unnecessary, 
duplicative expenses since without regulation the customer could 
use slack time on its inventory file circuits to transmit messages.51 
There is no sound reason to make a firm that has access to a built-in 
communications network buy TWX-Telex and possibly a whole set 
of new terminals to accomplish a result that otherwise might be 
accomplished relatively inexpensively. 
C. The Service Bureaus and Hybrid 
Communication Services 
The Commission's decision to regulate hybrid communications 
will, as a practical matter, preclude data processing firms from 
offering such services. Theoretically, service bureaus might provide 
hybrid communications services at tariffed rates.52 But hybrid com-
munications services are usually offered as part of a specialized 
package of services, which are sold at a composite price. There is, 
in fact, no readily ascertainable discrete price for the communications 
service. Rather than engage in the trouble and expense of calculat-
50. Theoretically, service bureaus could provide the message-file service at tariffed 
rates. But practically, this is unlikely to occur. See note 52 infra and accompanying 
text. 
51. This would only be true of dedicated service as distinct from situations where 
several users are required to dial up the same line(s) to gain access to the computer, 
which consequently may be tied up during an individual user's slack period. 
52. If ••• [a] pack.age offering is oriented essentially to satisfy the communica-
tions or message-switching requirements of the subscriber • • • the entire service 
will be treated as a communications service for hire, whether offered by a common 
carrier or non-common carrier and will be subject to regulation under the 
Communications Act. 
Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 305. But see text accompanying note 67 infra. 
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ing rates for message files and filing formal tariffs, service bureaus 
would probably cease offering the service.58 
Upon examination, however, there appears to be no logical 
or economic reason why service bureaus could not compete on an 
untariffed basis with regulated common carriers in the provision 
of hybrid communications. The most obvious form of hybrid com-
munication function performed by a computer involves store and 
forward functions,54 in which the computer acts as an intermediary 
between the sender and the receiver in much the same fashion as a 
telephone answering service-storing, reorganizing, and fonvarding 
data. No one has ever suggested that telephone answering services 
should be tariffed.55 Yet, the language of the Commission's decision 
makes it clear that these store and forward services, which inci-
dentally involve elements of data processing, must be tariffed 
whether offered by a common carrier or not.56 
I£ the hybrid communications market exhibited the charac-
teristics of a natural monopoly, only one or two suppliers, presum-
ably the common carriers, could operate efficiently in the market, 
and it would be reasonable to exclude independent data processing 
firms. But the nature of and market for hybrid communications 
services, which are essentially store and forward, exhibit none of the 
characteristics of a natural monopoly.57 As one of the respondents 
in the Computer Inquiry states: 
[T]here is no reason why the regulated monopoly solution should 
be extended to the remote access data processing industry-or to 
specialized computer store and forward services. As noted above, 
the field is one of rapid innovation and change, low barriers to entry, 
in which many small competitors (service bureaus and information 
service firms) are operating. Moreover, remote access data processing 
does not require a fixed connection between the data processor and 
the customer distinct from established common carrier lines. There 
is not even a special public interest in averting the failure of remote 
access data processing firms. r;s 
53. See Response of International Business Mach. Corp. at I-31, Regulatory and 
Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communications 
Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter IBM Response] See also text 
accompanying note 67 infra. 
54. See note 40 supra. 
55. Response of the U.S. Dept. of Justice at 91, Regulatory and Policy Problems 
Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and 
Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter Dept. of Justice Response]. 
56. See text accompanying note 46 supra. 
57. Dept. of Justice Response, supra note 55, at 66-67, 90-91; Response of UNIVAC 
at C-7 to-11, D &: E-5, Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence 
of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [herein-
after UNIVAC Response]. 
58. Dept. of Justice Response, supra note 55, at 67. 
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However, it has been argued that to allow non-common carriers 
to compete in a market previously reserved to common carriers 
would result in "cream-skimming" by the non-common carriers. The 
Stanford Research Institute explained this idea when it stated that a 
new entrant 
would only wish to operate in the most favorable markets and he 
might prefer not to have to supply all users on the same basis. For 
example, if his system became fully used he would not wish to add 
customers until he could be fairly certain that there would be enough 
additional customers to pay the next increment in cost to add the 
next increment in capacity. True carriers object to this type of com-
petition as cream-skimming, and point out that if they lose high 
profit markets to cream-skimmers, they will have to raise rates for 
the low profit portions of their markets thus resulting in a loss of 
service to some areas of the country or to some classes of marginal 
users.59 
An answer to this argument is that non-common carriers can sell 
only communications circuits that they have leased from the 
common carriers at tariffed rates. Assuming the rate structure is cost-
oriented, the non-common carriers could make no profit on resale 
of circuits as part of hybrid communication offering-s.60 In other 
59. D. Dunn, Policy Issues Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and 
Communications Services, Stanford Research Institute, Rep. No. 7379B-2, at 20 (Feb. 
1969) (distributed by Clearinghouse for Federal Scientific and Technical Information, 
U.S. Dept. of Commerce). 
60. See Dept. of Justice Response, supra note 55, at 48-49. Under a cost-oriented 
pricing system the price of each service would be based on its economic cost. Thus 
the price charged for a single channel or group of channels should be the pro rata 
portion of the baseband cost plus the cost of channelization and additional administra-
trative costs. If this were the case, profit on resale of a leased baseband could be 
achieved only if the reseller could channelize more efficiently and with lower adminis-
trative costs than the carrier. This may be unlikely, but in the event it did occur, it 
is hard to find any reason to discourage it. Resale would yield easy profits only if 
the price charged for tariffed channels is out of line with the cost of the baseband. 
If the price of leasing a baseband is too low or the tariffed price for channels is too 
high, a lessee of a baseband could resell his channels at tariffed rates and make a 
profit. Even in such circumstances, however, a developed resale market with its own 
competition would quickly squeeze out the excess profit potential. Virtually nobody 
would buy a channel directly from the carrier, but if the baseband were properly 
priced, the carrier would not suffer and the public would benefit. 
An entirely separate possibility is that the pricing system is demand-oriented rather 
than cost-oriented. In an industry with declining costs, the marginal costs of a utility 
may equal the demand at a price which will not cover total costs. Thus, the utility 
will lose money if it produces the output that a perfect competitor would and charges 
a single price. One solution is to produce the competitive output and charge more 
than one price. By charging those with inelastic demands more than those with 
elastic demands, the utility can cover its costs. This system is rational so long as each 
buyer covers at least the marginal cost of producing the good and would not purchase 
the good at a higher price. See generally I A. KAHN, THE EcoNO?.llCS OF REGULATION: 
PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS 123-58 (1970). Whatever the merits of this scheme generally, 
it seems inapplicable here. The demand of a service bureau for a baseband is likely 
to reflect the demand of its customers for channels. Thus, it is likely that the service 
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words, there should be no cream to skim. Thus, there are no ap-
parent economic policy reasons for reserving the hybrid communi-
cations market for common carriers. 
Furthermore, permitting provision of hybrid communications 
services by data processing firms without regulation could produce 
at least two economic benefits. First, competition would stimulate 
innovation in the quality and variety of service offerings of both 
the service bureaus and the common carriers. 61 Second, entry of the 
service bureaus would increase the supply of hybrid communication 
service offerings, and thus lower the price for such services.62 
Perhaps the strongest justification for the Commission's decision 
to regulate hybrid communications is the argument that the Act may 
mandate such regulation. As the Commission stated: 
[T]here is a bona fide question as to whether [past] decisions may be 
construed to permit the Com.mission, by the exercise of administra-
tive discretion, to exempt from the provisions of the Act applicable 
to interstate common carrier communication services those activities 
which clearly or admittedly constitute a public offering of communi-
cation services. This is because Congress has specifically ordained 
that all such activities are subject to regulation and has fashioned a 
specific scheme of regulation therefor.63 
Assuming the Act does mandate regulation of hybrid communi-
cations, the Commission could open the door to competition by 
service bureaus in that market by treating the service bureaus differ-
ently than the common carriers. The Commission's interpretation 
of the Act's mandate would allow for such a regulatory scheme: 
[W]ithin the statutory scheme of regulation applicable to interstate 
common carrier services, the Commission may exercise appropriate 
discretion as to the methods and policies that will best serve the 
public interest in the regulation of hybrid communication ser-
vices.6' 
One approach would be to give service bureaus light-handed treat-
ment by requiring only that those offering hybrid communications 
services give notice to the Commission of the nature of their offer-
ings and their prices. The bureaus could then continue to offer 
their services until it was shown that they interfere with those 
bureau and individual users as a group have similar demand elasticities. This being 
so, there is no reason to charge a relatively higher price to the user who leases a single 
channel as opposed to the service bureau that leases many channels. Therefore, no 
reason exists to forbid resale of channels. 
61. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 18; Dept. of Justice Response, supra note 55, at 52. 
62. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 18. 
63. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 278. 
64. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 278. 
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common carrier services that the Commission has decided should not 
be offered competitively. Such an approach would, presumably, dis-
charge the Commission's regulatory duty65 without attaching pro-
hibitive conditions to service bureau competition in the hybrid 
communications market. 
The Commission could also circumvent the effects of regulating 
hybrid communications by watering down or eliminating the 
primary device by which unregulated competition is prevented: 
resale restrictions in the common carriers' tariffs. These restrictions 
make it illegal for service bureaus to lease communications lines 
from common carriers and then sublease them to customers as part 
of, for example, a hybrid communications service package.66 The 
Commission recognized the importance of these restrictions in its 
regulatory scheme when it stated: 
The non-common carrier generally will be using communication 
facilities leased from a common carrier to provide these services. 
We anticipate, therefore, that the communications common carrier 
providing the communications portion of the hybrid service will 
question any service that appears, in fact, to be a hybrid communi-
cations service. This is so because of the tariff provisions of the carrier 
that prohibit the resale of service by its customers.67 
It seems apparent that if resale were legal, the entry of data process-
ing firms into the hybrid communications market would no longer 
be blocked,-08 for, as a practical matter, resale is the only com-
munications service that service bureaus can offer. 
Finally, the Commission could avoid the consequences of its 
asserted obligation to regulate hybrid communications by expanding 
65. In achieving the objectives of the Act, the Commission is generally recognized 
as having discretion and flexibility in choosing its tools. See United States v. Midwest 
Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972); United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 
157 (1968); Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 359 F.2d 282, 284 (D.C. 
Cir. 1966); Ward v. FCC, 108 F.2d 486 (D.C. Cir. 1939). See also SEC v. Chenery, 332 
U.S. 195 (1947). This allows the Commission to regulate some classes of carriers more 
heavily than others, See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(b) (1972), which exempts small com-
mon carriers from the requirement of using separate affiliates to provide data proces-
sing services. See also 47 U.S.C. § 203(b) (1970). 
66. AT&T Tariff, FCC No. 260, ,I 2.2.3 (effective May 8, 1972). 
67. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 279. 
68. A further problem with resale restrictions is that they force a data processing 
firm to police its customers' use of its data processing system to prevent them from 
using the system for message-switching, store and forward, or the like, For example, 
though many service bureaus provide time in conjunction with a particular software 
package, so that all the customer does is insert the data and wait for the results 
(e.g., a payroll program), this is not always the case. Often the customer is buying 
varying amounts of straight time or file space and doing some programming of its 
own. There is no way that the vendor can prevent the use of this sort of computer 
time for message-switching without invading the privacy of the user's data. Even 
though the vendor states that this sort of use is unauthorized the vendee will be 
tempted to cheat. 
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tariff provisions that allow joint use of circuits under certain cir-
cumstances-the so-called "joint user tariffs."69 The expanded tariff 
could permit data processing firms and their customers to share 
circuits leased from a carrier. Alternatively, the Commission could 
approve expansion of "authorized user" tariffs, which currently 
allow resale of circuits in certain circumstances.70 
By deciding to regulate hybrid communications offerings, the 
Commission has undertaken a complex and difficult task that will 
entail large expenditures of time and resources. These prospective 
expenditures cannot be justified by any economic policy analysis 
since the hybrid communications market can accommodate and would 
indeed welcome non-common carrier competitors. 
D. The Carriers and Hybrid Communications Services 
It should be noted that the distinction between the two forms 
of hybrid services does have some merit when it is applied to 
common carriers' offerings of tariffed services. The line between 
hybrid communication and hybrid data processing marks the 
boundary between tariffed and nontariffed services. For the Bell 
System, this boundary is important because it is precluded from 
offering nontariffed services by a 1956 consent decree.71 In general, 
it is important that the scope of tariffed activities allowed to common 
carriers be clearly defined in order to prevent them from extending 
their monopolies into a competitive market through unfair competi-
tion or intimidation.72 
Furthermore, it may be more practical to fence the monopolist 
in the communication market than to fence competitive data process-
ing firms out. If the Commission's regulatory task were limited to 
keeping common carriers' tariffed service offerings within the 
boundaries delineated by hybrid communications services, the duties 
of the Commission would be much simplified. The Commission's 
primary task would be to scrutinize the activities of the relatively 
small number of common carriers, which are already under the 
regulatory eye, rather than the hundreds of service bureaus, which 
until now have been totally free from regulation. Presumably, fewer 
cases of carrier infringement on the data processing market would 
arise than cases of service bureau encroachment on the communi-
cation market, and the former class of cases would have broader 
69. These have been somewhat liberalized in recent years to relax restrictions on 
the number of joint usexs and to remove the restriction requiring joint users to 
occupy the same premises. AT&T Tariff, FCC No. 260, 11 3.1.5 (effective Aug. 12, 1971). 
70. AT&T Tariff, FCC No. 260, 11 2.5 (effective Aug. 12, 1971). 
71. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 71134, 71138 (D.N.J. 1956). 
This restriction was imposed as a condition of permitting the Bell System to keep 
Western Electric as a subsidiary. 
72. See notes 86-105 infra and accompan}ing text. 
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significance than the latter. Finally, in marked contrast to the 
carriers' often overzealous self-enforcement of their resale restric-
tion tariffs,73 the tariff proceeding would provide an orderly public 
means for enforcing limitations on carriers' activities.M 
IV. COMMON CAruuER. ENTRY INTO DATA PROCESSING 
The second major issue that confronted the Commission in the 
Computer Inquiry was under what circumstances, and subject to 
what conditions and safeguards, common carriers should be per-
mitted to engage in data processing. One initial observation is neces-
sary. At the time of the Final Decision, the Bell System had already 
been prohibited by a 1956 consent decree from offering non-common 
carrier services, which clearly include straight data processing.75 
This ban applied to direct offerings by an affiliated carrier (for ex-
ample, Michigan Bell) or by any other affiliate (for example, Western 
Electric). Therefore, the Commission realized that the largest carrier 
with the greatest potential for anticompetitive activity would not 
be a major factor in the data processing market. And it seems likely 
that its decision might have been different had it been faced with 
the possible entry of the Bell System into the market.76 
A. Advantages of Common Carrier Participation 
The common carriers argued to the Commission that there 
were two major advantages of their direct participation in data 
processing. First, their involvement would promote more efficient 
use of the off-peak excess capacity of in-house computers owned by 
the carriers and used for their own message- and circuit-switching.77 
Western Union was a particularly vigorous proponent of this view.78 
There are, however, important limitations on this alleged economy. 
One is that computers used for switching purposes are inefficient 
for general data processing use.79 Another is that some of the carriers' 
"excess" circuit-switching computer time could be used for in-house 
managerial functions rather than for sale to the public. Furthermore, 
the Commission felt that 
[i]t is characteristic of common carrier service that normal peaks shift 
and that abnormal or non-recurring peaks eventuate from time to 
time. The use of "off-peak" capacity for data processing would dero-
73. See notes 99-104 infra and accompanying text. 
74. See Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 288 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(e) (1972)). 
75. United States v. Western Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. 7ll34, 71138 (D.N.J.1956). 
76. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298-99, 304. 
77. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 30-32. 
78. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 271. 
79. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 30-32. 
November 1972} Notes 189 
gate from the carrier's ability to accommodate these occurrences. 
Such arrangements could result in an unacceptable conflict with the 
vital public functions for which the carriers are Iicensed.80 
The Commission also noted that proper system planning should 
hold off-peak capacity to a minimum.81 A policy prohibiting direct 
data processing offerings by carriers would encourage proper system 
planning in the first instance. The Commission could also have 
noted that should such excess capacity unexpectedly develop, it 
would be possible for carriers to sell some of their unneeded com-
puters. And in the event the carriers run short of capacity during 
peak periods, they could purchase computer time from service 
bureaus.82 
The second major advantage of free entry cited by the carriers 
was the additional competition that the carriers could provide. As 
a Stanford Research Institute study of the data processing market 
stated: "To prohibit the communications common carriers from 
offering data-processing services to the public is to pro tanto curtail 
freedom of entry into the data-processing industry. Presumptively, 
then, a rule permitting them to enter could be expected to confer 
social benefits."83 However, the study then examined the structure of 
the relevant markets, and concluded: 
From the standpoint of the competitiveness of the data-processing 
industry, then, the social benefits from permitting communications 
carriers to enter the data-processing industry may well be rather 
slight. The service areas are highly competitive at present and bar-
riers to entry are low. The range of other firms besides communi-
cations carriers that can offer data-processing seems sufficiently broad 
that the exclusion of the carriers would not have an important effect 
on the vigor of competition. Hence the concern for free entry appears 
to be largely academic in these fields.s4 
B. Disadvantages of Common Carrier Participation 
The Commission had to weigh the benefits of carrier entry into 
data processing against a number of drawbacks. Some of the evils 
relate to the effects of carrier entry on competition in the data 
processing market, while others concern potential problems in as-
suring and regulating the carriers' performance of their statutory 
duty to provide service on reasonable demand.85 
80. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 271. 
SI. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 271. 
82. Clearly, however, the carrier's requirement of specialized message- and circuit-
switching computers might limit the effectiveness of this solution. 
83. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 29. 
84. Id. at 30. 
85. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (1970). See note 116 infra and accompanying text. 
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I. Cross-Subsidization and Predatory Pricing 
Assuming the tariffed price for communications circuits exceeds 
the marginal cost of providing those circuits,86 a carrier could supply 
its own data processing operation with circuits at a lower cost than 
the rate it would charge to independent data processors. 87 Since the 
independents must lease their circuits from the carrier-monopolist 
at the tariffed price, the carrier's data processing division would 
receive an implicit subsidy from its competitors.88 The result might 
be unfairly and artificially low prices in the data processing market 
for the carrier's computer services. This could drive competitors out 
of the market or into docility and result in extension of the carrier's 
monopoly.89 Unlike unregulated monopolists, the carrier could en-
gage in this kind of predatory pricing without losing profits in its 
regulated communications operations because its long-run rate of 
return is, in effect, guaranteed.90 The cross-subsidization just de-
scribed would be very blatant and might easily be detected by the 
Commission. However, the more subtle forms, such as misallocation 
of general overhead and costs of facilities used for both data process-
ing and communication, would be difficult or impossible to detect. 
By shifting the allocation of costs from untariffed data processing 
to the tariffed activities, the carrier could gain a favored position in 
the unregulated market without affecting its fixed rate of return in 
the regulated market. Furthermore, to supply lines for its data 
processing operation, a carrier could justifiably engage in capital 
expansion, which would enlarge its rate base and result in an 
increase in total profi.ts.91 
However, fear of predatory pricing must be tempered by the 
realization that some carriers, particularly Western Union and some 
of the smaller independents, are not in a position to cross-subsidize 
their data processing services since their monopolies generate losses 
rather than profits. Illustratively, the Commission has noted the 
conclusion of the Stanford Research Institute that Western Union 
86. Since natural monopolies such as communications common caniers generally 
experience declining long-run marginal costs, in order to cover fully allocated costs 
it is usually necessary that the tariffed price of their services be above marginal cost. 
C. WILCOX, PUBLIC POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS 498-500 (1955); G. BACH, ECONOMICS 
409-15 (4th ed. 1963). But see note 60 supra. 
87. The Computer Utility, supra note 13, at 1305. 
88. Id. There are a few substitutes for present carrier services. Private microwave 
is one but limited to only the largest users. Id. at 1309. Specialized carriers offer a 
more realistic hope in the years to come. 
89. Cf. United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 436-39 (2d Cir. 
1945). 
90. FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944); Posner, Natural Monopoly 
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REv. 548, 592-606 (1969). 
91. See Averch 8: Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 
AM. ECON. REV. 1052 (1962). 
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"has no reserve or monopoly power to support a period of below-
cost pricing without bankruptcy."92 
It is clear that to some extent the Commission recognized the 
potential adverse effects of cross-subsidization on competition when 
it expressed these concerns: 
. . . That the costs related to the furnishing of such data pro-
cessing services should not be passed on, directly or indirectly, to the 
users of common carrier services; 
... That revenues derived from common carrier services should 
not be used to subsidize any data processing services; and 
• . . That the furnishing of such data processing services by car-
riers should not inhibit free and fair competition between commu-
nication common carriers and data processing companies or other-
wise involve practices contrary to the policies and prohibitions of 
the anti-trust laws.93 
2. Discrimination in Providing Competitors with Services 
Even assuming that a carrier properly allocates costs between 
regulated and nonregulated services, there are a number of other 
ways that it could unfairly utilize its monopoly position in the data 
processing market. Some illustrations of potential abuses are dis-
cussed below. 
a. Slow response to orders for new service. A common carrier's 
competitors in the data processing market may be given lower 
priorities for installations of communications equipment than the 
carrier provides itself or, for that matter, the general public. This 
might curtail the ability of competitors to provide prompt service 
to new customers or to respond to old customers' expanding needs. 
The duration between an order and an installation normally varies 
considerably between particular local sites and, on a larger scale, 
between geographical regions and fluctuates from day to day accord-
ing to demands for new services and the carrier's ability to provide 
them. Therefore, it is very difficult for the data processing firm to 
determine whether and when it is being discriminated against. For 
example, all the information as to queues, priorities, and workmen 
available is internal to the telephone company. Indeed, it is often 
only through some informational leak, which carriers do their best 
to prevent, that a policy of discrimination is revealed.9"' When dis-
crimination is detected it can be very difficult to prove. The nature 
92. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 301, citing D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 37. 
93. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 269. 
94. This information has been gathered by personal interviews with personnel 
involved in the management of data communications networks used for computer time-
sharing. 
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of such discrimination is subtle, the evidence is easy to conceal, and 
the burden of proof is on the complaining customer.95 
Even if the victim of discrimination has evidence, the legal 
process can be ruinously slow. Bunker Ramo's complaints of dis-
crimination against Western Union are illustrative of the potential 
for delay and its consequences: 
[T]he Complaint was filed June 5, 1970; a Motion to Make More 
Definite and Certain was filed by Western Union on July 7, 1970 
and denied by the Commission on September 2, 1970; an Answer, 
Supplementary Answer, and Motion to Dismiss Complaint were 
filed on October 5, 1970. On April 15, 1971, that Motion was re-
ported to have been denied and the case set down for hearing. In all 
likelihood, more than a year will have passed between the filing of 
formal Complaint and the beginning of hearings before an examiner. 
Yet (as will surely be the experience in like cases) the damages con-
tinue unabated.96 
b. Slow response to outages. Analytically, this is the same prob-
lem as delay in making new installations. In addition, however, 
delays in repairing of existing equipment may disrupt the flow of 
services and leave costly computer hardware standing idle for ex-
tended periods. Again, Bunker Ramo's allegations supply an example 
of this potential for abuse: 
As of March 18, 1971 . . . fifteen lines were out. As many as five 
months are required to restore such outages and Bunker Ramo must 
wait as long as eight months for new installations by Western Union. 
Customer complaints, cancellations and threats of cancellation con-
tinue to grow.01 
c. Assignment of inferior grade lines and switching facilities. 
95. See 47 U.S.C. § 206 (1970). 
96. Bunker Ramo Corp., Petition for Reconsideration at 8-9, Regulatory and Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computers and Communication 
Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter Bunker Ramo Petition]. See 
Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 270 n.5. 
Bunker Ramo was overly optimistic in its time estimates. The case has still not 
been heard on the merits. After the Commission ordered a hearing (Bunker Ramo 
Corp. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 28 F.C.C.2d 616 (1971)), the hearing examiner 
recommended dismissal of the complaint with prejudice, since Bunker Ramo had 
presented no evidence. 37 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., Dec. 13, 1971, at 28. Bunker 
Ramo and the Common Carrier Bureau, however, are asking the Review Board to 
reverse the hearing examiner because he refused to allow discovery. 38 id., Jan 24, 
1972, at 40. 
Bunker Ramo failed to mention that the legal expenses of suits charging dis-
crimination, which are often sufficient to bankrupt some small service bureaus, are 
operating expenses of a carrier like Western Union that can eventually be passed on 
to the public in the form of higher rates. See Driscoll v. Edison Light & Power Co., 
307 U.S.104 (1939). 
97. Bunker Ramo Petition, supra note 96, at 9. See also Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d 
at 274. 
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More so than in voice transmissions, the quality of equipment used 
in data transmission is important in keeping error rates low. Simi-
larly, efficient switching facilities are desirable for the optimal usage 
of multiplexed leased lines.98 Carrier discrimination against data 
processing firms in assignment of switching apparatus and in the 
proper conditioning of lines could have serious adverse effects on the 
ability of independent time sharers to compete. 
d. Refusal to provide service on the grounds of alleged tariff 
violations. Under the guise of enforcing tariff restrictions, a carrier 
could put its service bureau customers at a severe disadvantage in 
the data processing market. The carrier is in the position of being 
the first and, as a practical matter in many cases, the only judge 
of whether a service bureau customer's activities violate the carrier's 
tariffs.99 Thus, the carrier can often obstruct a service bureau's 
offering of a new service by refusing to lease its facilities on the 
grounds that the new service would violate resale, interconnection, 
or other tariff restrictions.100 The problems of Bunker Ramo provide 
illustration. In 1965 Bunker Ramo proposed to provide its customers 
with Telequote IV, a stock information service. The service had 
data processing features and also had a message-switching capability 
that allowed stock brokers in different locations to key into the 
computer and virtually negotiate stock transfers.101 Claiming that 
Telequote IV was a communications service that violated the resale 
restrictions in its tariffs, Western Union refused to provide lines for 
the service.102 Under the Final Decision, the question of whether 
Telequote IV constituted a tariff violation would hinge on whether 
it was hybrid data processing or hybrid communications. Western 
Union was the first judge of this question.103 Protracted litigation 
would have been required to challenge successfully Western Union's 
refusal to provide service. Bunker Ramo described the result of 
Western Union's action: 
Despite meetings and correspondence with the Commission and its 
staff, the practical consequence of carrier intransigence in that in-
98. Multiplexing is the division of a high-speed private line into several lower 
speed channels for simultaneous use (in these circumstances) by several terminals. 
G. DIPPEL &: W. HouSE, supra note 9, at 470. Discriminations in provision of switching 
facilities could include: (1) refusal to provide long rotary hunt groups and (2) 
insistence on putting data users in step-by-step central offices where noisy switching 
equipment raises havoc with data transmission. 
99. See Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 279-80. 
100. See text accompanying note 66 supra. 
101. Irwin, The Computer Utility: Market Entry in Search of Public Policy, 17 J. 
!NDUSTIUAL ECON. 239, 240-43 (1969) [hereinafter Entry and Public Policy]. 
102. Id. at 241-42. 
103. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 279-80. 
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stance was the withdrawal of the Telequote IV from the market and 
termination of further planning for the service.104 
3. Tying 
Because of the carriers' control over telephone and other com-
munications services needed by the data processing customer, the 
carrier can exert subtle pressures on the customer to buy data 
processing services from it, thereby extending its communications 
monopoly into the data processing market. Such tying arrangements 
may well be illegal under the antitrust laws,105 but the violation 
might be difficult to detect and prove. Furthermore, during the in-
evitable delay occasioned by a trial on the issue of antitrust liability, 
the competitive disadvantage of the service bureaus vis-a-vis the car-
rier would presumably not improve. 
4. Interference with Common Carrier Functions 
In its primary role as regulator of the flow of communications 
services, the Commission expressed concern that 
without appropriate regulatory safeguards, the provision of data 
processing services by common carriers could adversely affect the 
statutory obligation of such carriers to provide adequate communica-
tion services under reasonable terms and conditions . . . .100 
It is unclear whether the Commission regarded this possibility as a 
substantial disadvantage of carrier participation in data processing, 
or whether it merely advanced this consideration as a justification 
for its assertion of regulatory authority over carrier offerings of data 
processing services.107 
C. The Commission's Response: The Principle 
of Maximum Separation 
The Commission had already decided that data processing as such 
should not be regulated.108 Thus, it follows that if carriers were to 
104. Bunker Ramo Petition, supra note 96, at 10-11. 
105. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co, 
v. United States., 332 U.S. 392 (1947). 
106. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 269. Section 201 of the Communications Act 
defines the duties of common carriers: 
(a) It shall be the duty of every common carrier engaged in interstate or foreign 
communications by wire or radio to furnish such communication service upon 
reasonable request therefor •••• 
(b) All charges, practices, classifications, and regulations for and in connection with 
such communication service, shall be just and reasonable •••• 
47 u.s.c. § 201 (1970). 
107. See Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 300; text accompanying notes 113-18 
infra. 
108. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 298. 
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offer data processing services, it would be on a nontariffed basis. 
The Commission concluded, in part for the reasons indicated above, 
that the evils involved in free carrier participation in the data 
processing market far outweighed the benefits.109 It did feel, how-
ever, that limited carrier participation could be beneficial if the 
potentials for abuse outlined above could be eliminated. For this 
reason, it approved carrier participation under the principle of 
maximum separation.11° 
Thus, the Commission decided that the common carriers would 
be allowed to furnish data processing services only through separately 
incorporated affiliates. m Additional safeguards designed to ensure 
maximum separation were set out as follows: 
(I) Each such separate corporation must maintain its own books 
of account, have separate officers, utilize separate operating per-
sonnel, and utilize computing equipment and facilities separate from 
those of the carrier for its data processing service offerings. 
(2) Each such common carrier shall file with the Commission a 
complete statement of the terms and conditions of every written or 
oral contract, agreement or other arrangement entered into between 
such carrier and any such separate corporation within 30 days after 
the contract, agreement, or other arrangement is made. 
(3) No such common carrier [whose annual operating revenues 
exceed I million dollars] shall engage in the sale or promotion of 
data processing services on behalf of any such separate corporation. 
(4) No such common carrier, or a holding company owning or 
jointly owning a comm.on carrier and any such separate corporation, 
shall permit the separate corporation to employ in its name any 
words or symbols contained in the name of the carriers, nor shall 
such carrier or holding company permit any such separate corpora-
tion to use the name of the carrier in the separate corporation's pro-
motional activities or enterprises. 
(5) No such common carrier shall purchase, lease, or otherwise 
obtain any data processing service or services from any such separate 
corporation.112 
It might be contended that these rules in effect regulate data 
processing in contradiction of the Commission's stated policy. If this 
contention were valid, the question of the Commission's jurisdiction 
109. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 269-70; Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 301-02. 
no. 28 F.C.C.2d at 269. 
111. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (1972)). 
A similar approach is being advocated to prevent cost misallocations between public 
and private lines. 38 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., March 13, 1972, at 4-7. The one 
exception to the separate-affiliate rule is carriers whose annual revenues are less than 
I million dollars (unless controlled by or under common control with carrier(s) whose 
total revenues exceed I million dollars per year). 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(b) (1972). 
112, Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 287-88 (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c) (1972)). 
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to regulate data processing would be squarely presented. The Com-
mission attempted to avoid this question, stating: 
It should be made clear that we are not seeking to regulate data 
processing as such, nor are we attempting to regulate the substance 
of any carrier's offerings of data processing. Rather, we are limiting 
regulation to requirements respecting the framework in which a car-
rier may publicly offer particular non-regulated services, the nature 
and characteristics of which require separation before predictable 
abuses are given opportunity to arise.113 
Viewed in this light, the jurisdictional question may by reformulated: 
Is the Commission's mandate in the communications field broad 
enough to govern the activities of carriers in nonregulated areas 
when those activities can affect their abilities to perform their roles 
as common carriers? 
The Commission itself noted that there is no statutory provision 
that bars common carriers from offering nonregulated services.1H 
But the Commission also recognized that the absence of a specific 
statutory bar does not necessarily mean that it "may not exercise its 
jurisdiction over carriers to prescribe appropriate conditions for en-
gaging in non-regulated services or to prohibit the furnishing of 
such services where such activities burden or impair their common 
carrier communications obligations.''115 Citing a broad range of 
statutory powers designed to effectuate the policies and objectives 
of the Communications Act,116 the Commission concluded: 
[W]e have ample jurisdiction to bar carriers from providing data 
processing services upon a proper finding that it would prevent them 
from discharging their common carrier responsibilities in a manner 
consistent with the standards and objectives of the Communications 
Act. We, therefore, also have the jurisdiction and authority to sur-
round the provision of these services with such appropriate safe-
guards as may be necessary to carry out the policies and objectives 
of the Communications Act.117 
Given the expansive view taken by the Supreme Court of the 
Commission's power,118 the Commission's conclusion appears to be 
sound. The powers assumed by the Commission over carrier entry 
into data processing are in no way excessive. They are designed to 
113. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 277. 
114. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 299. 
115. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 299-300. 
116. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 300, citing, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§ 20l{a) 
(authority to prescribe regulations to assure reasonableness of carrier's practices), 
20l(b) (authority to prevent unjust discrimination in service), 205(a) (authority to 
control extensions of facilities). 
117. Tentative Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 301. 
118. United States v. Midwest Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649 (1972). 
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ensure that the regulated monopolist will perform its statutory duty 
and to protect the public and the competitive sectors from monopoly 
power. This is the classic role of the regulatory commission. 
D. Evaluation of the Commission's Response 
The Commission's requirement of separate books, personnel, and 
physical facilities will probably eliminate the problem of the mis-
allocation of investment and costs between communication services 
and data processing services, which is the most obvious source of 
cross-subsidization.119 There remains, however, some question as to 
whether a data processing affiliate could lease space from its parent 
for non-data processing purposes. The answer depends on whether 
the Commission's prohibition against shared facilities applies to 
"computing" facilities only or, in general, to all facilities. There are 
sound policy reasons for adopting the latter interpretation. Proper 
allocation of costs could be made difficult by the shared use of non-
computer facilities. By charging its computer affiliate a very low rent, 
a carrier could achieve a cross-subsidy. Furthermore, if the other 
interpretation prevails, the Commission will be faced with the task 
of policing the terms of numerous leases and other contracts between 
carriers and their affiliates to ensure that they do not involve sharing 
of "computing" facilities.120 Perhaps in recognition of these prob-
lems, the Commission explicitly adopted the view121 that "[ e Jach such 
data processing entity ... shall use equipment and facilities devoted 
exclusively to data processing and other non-common carrier 
services."122 This statement apparently precludes sharing of a more 
general class of facilities than merely the "computing" facilities. 
However, it seems to leave open the possibility that an affiliate could 
lease an entire building from its parent, which would not involve 
sharing of facilities but would involve the potential of cross-subsidy. 
The Commission's restriction of promotional efforts by the 
parent on behalf of its subsidiary probably was aimed at two evils. 
The first is the potential for cross-subsidy in having the parent 
handle the advertising of the subsidiary. The second is the possibility 
of subtle innuendoes by carrier service representatives that service 
might improve if the carrier's data processing affiliate were used. It 
is not clear whether the Commission's rules can prevent this latter 
form of proaffiliate advertising by carriers; the rules may be difficult 
Il9. See text accompanying notes 87-93 supra. 
120. The Commission has not totally ignored this problem as it has required that 
carriers file all contracts between themselves and their data processing subsidiaries 
with the FCC. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(c)(2) (1972). Presumably the commission staff will 
exercise some supervision regarding the terms of such contracts, so as to prevent 
subsidies. 
121. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 271. 
122. 28 F.C.C.2d at 303. 
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to enforce against thousands of carrier sales representatives, who, 
either on their own initiative or in response to customer inquiries, 
might make "suggestions" to customers about the availability of 
data processing services from the carrier's affiliate. 
Denying affiliates the use of the parent's corporate names or 
symbols, the Commission pointed out, is a corollary of forbidding 
promotions for the affiliate.123 Chairman Burch viewed this restric-
tion as naive.m It does represent, however, a very real denial of a 
substantial advantage to the subsidiary. Without this restriction, 
every advertisement for the carrier would also indirectly advertise 
the affiliate and pro tanto subsidize it.125 For example, if the Bell 
System were allowed to create a data processing affiliate named "Bell 
Data Services," each advertisement of telephone service paid for by 
the Bell System would be an indirect plug for Bell Data Services. 
The prohibition against sales of computer time by affiliates to 
their parents was the Commission's most controversial ruling and 
provoked three dissents.126 Chairman Burch criticized this restriction 
as "knee jerk" reaction and "regulatory overkill" that attacked what 
was only a possible, but not a likely, abuse.127 He felt that the action 
might in some cases deny a carrier the use of the most efficient 
supplier available, its own affiliate. Notwithstanding this consider-
ation, the majority of the Commission was concerned that allowing 
deals of this sort would encourage several abuses. First, it would be 
very easy for an affiliate to overcharge its parent and thereby receive 
a subsidy.128 The Commission felt that the burden of policing these 
arrangements for possible price discriminations subsidizing the affil-
iate would unduly tax its resources. It stated: 
Any improprieties in such dealings would be difficult to detect and 
rectify in view of the fact that data processing service offerings, and 
the charges made therefore, are neither fixed nor stable, but may 
vary considerably among customers.129 
This view was probably based in part on the Commission's experi-
ence with the problems of monitoring the pricing of carriers' manu-
facturing subsidiaries, such as Western Electric.180 
123. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 272. 
124. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 290 (opinion concuning in part and dissenting 
in part). 
125. See also United States v. International Business Mach. Corp., 1956 Trade Cas. 
71117, 71125 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) (consent judgment). 
126. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 289-90. Chairman Burch wrote the dissenting 
opinion, in which he was joined by Commissioners Wells and Lee. 
127. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 289-90. 
128. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 272-73. 
129. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 273. 
130. The Commission planned an extensive investigation of the relationship between 
Western Electric's prices and the Bell System's rates only to discontinue the attempt 
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Another potential evil was suggested by the analytical similarity 
between the carrier-data affiliate arrangement and a "vertical" 
merger. The Commission argued that the size of the carriers made 
them prime customers for the service bureaus. If carrier affiliates 
were allowed to sell to their parents, the independent service bureaus 
would probably be foreclosed from a major segment of the market.181 
It seems likely that the carrier would prefer to buy from its affiliate 
even if independents could offer it services more cheaply and 
efficiently. The long-term refusal of carriers to tolerate the use of 
nonsubsidiary equipment should have been and perhaps was enough 
to convince the Commission not to make the same mistake with the 
data affiliates.182 
Finally, the dissenters suggested that the Commission's limitation 
"would deny to the common carriers . . . and to their users the 
fruits of economies of scale."133 However, it is difficult to see how 
allowing an affiliate with separate facilities and personnel to sell data 
processing services to its parent would achieve any economies of scale. 
The Commission's over-all approach unfortunately leaves a 
number of gaps, for the Commission failed to safeguard against the 
more subtle devices the carriers can employ to favor their affiliates. 
Preferences in installations, maintenance, and equipment quality 
were almost totally ignored. Similarly, it is not clear what type of 
personnel-sharing is prohibited. For example, the possibility that 
the parent could train personnel and then transfer them to the 
subsidiary, which would be a form of cross-subsidy, was not un-
ambiguously dealt with. Another potential abuse that the Commis-
sion did not act to prevent is the secret transfer by the common 
carrier to its subsidiary of the products of its own research and de-
velopment (including trade secrets and computer software) before 
they have been released to the general public.134 
because of inadequate resources. American Tel.&: Tel. Co., 32 F.C.C.2d 691 (1971). Among 
the states, California has been a leader in regulating Western Electric's prices to Bell 
System companies. City of Los Angeles v. Public Util. Commn., 7 Cal. 3d 331, 497 P.2d 
785, 102 Cal. Rptr. 313 (1972). See generally Irwin &: McKee, Vertical Integration and 
tlze Communications Industry: Alternatives for Public Policy, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 446 
(1968); Irwin, Vertical Integration and tlze Communications Industry: Separation of 
Western Electric and ATbT, 3 ANTITRUST L. &: EcoN. REV. 125 (1969). 
131. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 273. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 
370 U.S. 294 (1962); United States v. EJ. duPont de Nemours &: Co., 353 U.S. 586 
(1957). It should be noted that the Bell System currently uses service bureaus for part 
of its data processing needs. Statement of Bell System Companies, § 1, at 1, Regulatory 
and Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computers and Communica-
tion Services and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971). 
132. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, afjd. 
on rehearing, 14 F.C.C.2d 571 (1968). 
133. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 289. 
134. See Comments of CTSS on Proposed Rule Making at 7, Regulatory and Policy 
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services 
and Facilities, 28 F.C.C.2d 267 (1971) [hereinafter CTSS Comments]. 
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The Commission did indicate a certain degree of sensitivity to 
these potential abuses when it stated: 
[W]e are mindful that carriers serving their affiliates, as well as the 
competitors of those affiliates, may be inclined to resolve service and 
facility problems which arise in specific situations in favor of their 
own affiliates. We wish to make it clear any such favoritism is con-
trary to the obligations of the carriers under the requirements of 
the Act. Specifically, the carriers may not give any preference to affi-
liates in offering of facilities or services, in the timing of the instal-
lation of facilities, in the quality of service offered or in the charges 
for like services. We expect the carrier will live up to the spirit as 
well as the letter, of their obligations. We will, however, monitor 
closely the actions of the carriers in serving their affiliates and non-
affiliates and will take prompt action, including the consideration 
of the imposition of specific requirements by rule, should we find 
that our confidence has been misplaced.135 
There are serious doubts, however, about the ability of the Com-
mission to monitor carefully the types of activities described since 
even the injured party may not be aware of them. The subtle forms 
of favoritism will in fact be much more difficult to monitor than 
sales of data services by affiliates to their parents, which the Com-
mission refused to allow because of the regulatory burden that 
attempting to police such transactions would entail. Furthermore, 
we can hardly expect the Commission to be prompt in cracking 
down on discovered abuses after its slow response to Bunker Ramo's 
allegations.136 By the time the Commission acts, it may be too late 
to save competition in the industry. 
In order to ensure effective competitive safeguards, the total 
exclusion approach should have been adopted. The Stanford Re-
search Institute study indicated that the benefits of carrier par-
ticipation, if any, would not be large.137 On the other hand, the 
opportunities for subtle discrimination are numerous and difficult 
to detect. On balance, total exclusion of carriers from data processing 
appears more desirable than the restricted-participation approach 
chosen by the Commission. 
Given the Commission's commitment to carrier participation, 
additional safeguards have been offered that would further amelio-
rate the threats to a competitive data processing market. 
First, it has been suggested that no common carrier affiliate 
should be allowed to market data processing services in the service 
area of its affiliated common carrier.138 In its own service area the 
135. Final Decision, 28 F.C.C.2d at 274. 
136. See note 96 supra and accompanying text. 
137. D. Dunn, supra note 59, at 33. 
138. CTSS Comments, supra note 134, at 15. 
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carrier's power is greatest. Its ability to discriminate in installation, 
maintenance, and equipment is largely confined to this area. Ex-
clusion of affiliates from their parents' service areas would preclude 
carriers from giving their affiliates preferences to the disadvantage 
of independent service bureaus. 
There are two major problems that seriously undermine the 
utility of this recommendation. First, part of the rationale of the 
Commission's decision was undoubtedly its solicitude for Western 
Union's need to diversify.139 Since Western Union's service area is 
national, the recommended rule would totally preclude it from 
organizing a data processing affiliate. Related to this problem is 
the fact that the proposed rule would exclude common carriers' 
subsidiaries from bidding on large national customers who require 
service in some of the locations serviced by the parent company. 
The second major problem is that in some remote service areas, the 
existing local carrier's subsidiary may be virtually the sole source 
of certain types of computer services.140 
A second recommendation is that there should be a complete 
embargo on transfers to an affiliate of any information regardmg 
technical developments of the parent common carrier, research and 
development projects, and system design studies, except to the extent 
that such information is simultaneously made available to the public. 
There should also be more explicit, detailed controls over personnel 
transfers. These restrictions may help to prevent cross-subsidies dis-
cussed previously. Finally, expedited procedures could ameliorate 
the problems inherent in slow enforcement of the Commission's 
rules. In addition, subtle cross-subsidies might be deterred by a rule 
that any carrier that discriminates in favor of its data processing 
affiliate must divest itself of that affiliate. 
Even accepting these further restrictions, it is questionable 
whether the Commission's principle of "maximum separation" is 
sound. Given the Commission's conclusion that data processing is 
in important respects distinguishable from communications services 
and is amenable to the regulation of the market place, it would seem 
best to allow the carriers to do what they are licensed to do along 
with such incidental activities as are necessary to these tasks and not 
permit them to get sidetracked into essentially unrelated areas. 
The Commission mentioned one more factor that may prove in 
the long run to be of much greater importance than all the safe-
guards mentioned. The policy of the Commission with respect to 
the entry of new specialized common carriers into competition with 
139. See Entry and Public Policy, supra note IOI, at 240, 244-46; D. Dunn, supra 
note 59, at 32-33. 
140. This was one of the arguments advanced by the General Telephone System 
in its suit to overturn the Commission's Final Decision. 37 TELECOMMUNICATIONS REP., 
April 19, 1971, at IO. 
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existing carriers could eliminate the dependence of the data process-
ing industry on single monopolists, at least for bulk long-lines ser-
vice.141 Some of the specialized carriers have also announced plans 
for local distribution networks,142 which would supply an alternative 
source of local lines in the event a major carrier attempted to dis-
criminate against independent service bureaus and in favor of its 
own data processing affiliate. Even in this case, pressures that a car-
rier could place on data processing service bureau customers to buy 
their services from the carrier's affiliate would not be eliminated. 
V. CONCLUSIONS 
The Commission's distinction between hybrid communications 
and hybrid data processing is useful for confining common carriers 
to the sphere of regulated communications activities without stifling 
improvements in their basic communications services through devel-
opment of auxiliary data processing functions. But regulation of 
hybrid communications may prevent service bureaus from reselling 
communications services as part of data processing packages. This 
result would be unfortunate because it would create inefficient and 
costly duplications of facilities without accomplishing any useful 
regulatory objective. Furthermore, it would prevent data processing 
firms from introducing healthy competition into the hybrid commu-
nications market, which need not and should not be monopolized 
by common carriers. 
With regard to data processing and hybrid data processing, the 
Commission has burdened itself with the very difficult task of polic-
ing the common carriers in their various and subtle relations with 
their affiliates and with the service bureaus. The result is that we 
must indeed trust the good faith of the carriers as the regulatory task 
will likely prove impossible. 
141. See Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971). 
142. Specialized Common Carrier Services, 29 F.C.C.2d at 872-76. 
